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INTRODUCTION 
The Hatch-Waxman Act1 of 1984 regulates approval by the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) of generic counterparts to 
patented drugs. In a series of recent cases, large pharmaceutical 
companies have been accused of exploiting Hatch-Waxman in vio-
lation of the antitrust laws.2  In essence, the allegations are con-
cerned with the large pharmaceutical companies that have paid 
manufacturers not to market inexpensive generic versions of pat-
ented drugs, thereby restraining trade and maintaining a monop-
oly.3 
In the case of Biovail v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaf, Inc., the 
generic drug manufacturer, Biovail, sued Hoechst Aktiengesell-
schaf (“Hoechst”), a pharmaceutical company, for antitrust viola-
tions resulting from Biovail’s effort to gain approval from the FDA 
to market a generic version of Cardizem, a heart drug patented by 
Hoechst. 4  The claims are that Hoechst unfairly manipulated the 
Hatch-Waxman Act to prevent Biovail from obtaining FDA ap-
proval for a generic counterpart to Cardizem.5 
Even though the defendant Hoechst, may have intended to ex-
clude the plaintiff, Biovail, as competitors, Hoechst will be sub-
stantially immune from antitrust liability under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine (“Noerr Immunity”), because Hoechst was 
acting within its constitutionally protected rights. 6  The Noerr Im-
munity enjoyed by Hoechst is necessary to insure that the free-
competition goals of the antitrust laws do not destroy Hoechst’s 
right to petition the government, as guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.7 
 
1. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
2. See Anne Marie Squeo, FTC Investigates Drug Makers’ Patents, SUN-SENTINEL, 
March 10, 1999, at 3D. 
3. Id. 
4. 49 F. Supp. 2d 750 (1999) (denying motion of FTC dismissal). 
5. Id. 
6. Eastern R.R. Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc, 365 U.S. 127, 145 (1961) 
(holding that the antitrust laws do not prohibit people from associating together to peti-
tion a branch of the government, even if the desired action is anticompetative.) 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
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Part I of this Comment discusses both the legal framework of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act as well as Biovail’s claims.  Part II ana-
lyzes Biovail’s claims with respect to potential violations by 
Hoechst under section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act (the “Sherman Act”).  Part III analyzes Hoechst’s immunity 
under the Noerr Immunity doctrine.  This Comment concludes that 
the Noerr Immunity doctrine protects Hoechst, even if they in-
tended to manipulate the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
I.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Biovail’s claims against Hoechst invoke issues of patent in-
fringement and the Hatch-Waxman Act.  This section reviews both 
of these aspects, and presents Biovail’s claims. 
A.  Patent Infringement 
Hoechst, like any patent owner, has the right to exclude others 
from making, using or selling Cardizem in the United States during 
the lifetime of its patent.8  Under current law, the lifetime of a 
United States patent grant shall be “for a term beginning on the 
date on which the patent was issued and ending twenty years from 
the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the 
United States.”9  Any competitor who sells a generic version of 
Cardizem commits an act of patent infringement: an individual or 
company that “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells 
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent 
therefor, infringes the patent.”10  An individual or corporation who 
infringes a U.S. patent may be found liable to the patent owner for 
treble damages.11 
Manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals, such as Biovail, 
 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances.” Id. 
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (Supp. III 1997); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994). 
9. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).  Special rules apply for patents if the application on 
which it issues was filed prior to June 8, 1995. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (1994). 
10. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
11. 35 U.S.C.§ 284 (1994). 
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may seek FDA approval to sell patented drugs under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, prior to the expiration of the U.S. patent.12  Seeking 
approval from the FDA under the Hatch-Waxman Act for a pat-
ented drug, however, constitutes an act of patent infringement.13 
B.  FDA Approval of Patented Drugs Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA approval process re-
quires that the generic manufacturer file an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (“ANDA”).14  The ANDA allows a generic equivalent 
of brand name drugs to forego expensive and lengthy clinical test-
ing and rely on the test results of the brand name counterpart.15  In 
addition, the process requires the generic manufacturer to state that 
the patent for the drug is invalid or will not be infringed by the ge-
neric counterpart and to notify the holder of the patent that an 
ANDA has been filed.16  Once notified, the patent holder may sue 
the applicant for patent infringement on the basis of the ANDA.17 
Since the cost and risk of patent litigation is high,18 Hatch-
Waxman provides an incentive for generic manufacturers to chal-
lenge patents on drugs which may be invalid, unenforceable or not 
infringed by the ANDA.19  The incentive is the right to a 180-day 
exclusivity period for the first manufacturer to submit an ANDA 
for a specific generic drug.20  The exclusivity period starts from the 
 
12. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
13. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (1994). 
14. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994). 
15. Id.; See also Melissa K. Davis, Monopolistic Tendencies of Brand-Name Drug 
Companies in Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 J.L.& COM. 357, 363-65 (1995). The policy 
basis for Hatch-Waxman is to increase the number of generic drugs available to consum-
ers by providing an accelerated mechanism whereby generic manufacturers can challenge 
patented drugs.  Hatch-Waxman also benefits companies that develop new drugs by ex-
tending the patent lifetime when approval for new drug results in a shortened marketing 
period during which the drug enjoys patent protection.  Id. 
16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
17. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).  The filing of a patent suit based on an ANDA delays the 
marketing of the generic drug by 30 months or until resolution by the parties, whichever 
comes first.  Id. 
18. Damages paid by the infringing party may be up to three times the actual dam-
ages incurred by the plaintiff.  35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994). 
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (Supp. IV 1998). 
20. Id. 
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earlier of either: (i) the day that the initial applicant first markets 
the drug (the “commercial marketing trigger”) or (ii) the day a 
court decides the original patent is invalid or not infringed by the 
generic drug (the “court decision trigger”).21  During the exclusiv-
ity period, the FDA will not approve any subsequent ANDAs.22  
Consequently, the first company to file an ANDA can market its 
drug without generic competition for 180-days, thus increasing the 
likelihood that the first company will become the dominant generic 
supplier when the exclusivity period expires.23 
In Biovail, the first company to apply for an ANDA to sell ge-
neric Cardizem was the drug manufacturer Andrx.24  Andrx filed 
an ANDA in September of 1995 and thereafter served on Hoechst 
certification that the ANDA did not infringe any outstanding 
Hoechst patents.25  Hoechst responded by filing a patent infringe-
ment action against Andrx.26  On September 15, 1997, the FDA 
gave preliminary approval for Andrx to market the generic form of 
Cardizem.27  On September 26, 1997, Hoechst and Andrx entered 
into a partial settlement agreement.28  Under the partial settlement, 
Hoechst and Andrx agreed to continue litigating the infringement 
suit in the courts.29  However, Hoechst promised to make quarterly 
payments to Andrx in the amount of ten million dollars.30  In ex-
change, Andrx agreed to refrain from marketing its generic drug 
until the resolution of the suit and to assert its right of exclusivity, 
as the first in line, against other potential producers of generic Car-
dizem.31  Since reaching the agreement, neither Hoechst nor Andrx 
have actively advanced the litigation.32 
 
21. Id. 
22. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (1994). 
23. Id. 
24. See Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaf, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 
2d 1042, 1046 (1999) (remanding to Kansas state court for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
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On June 19, 1997, Biovail filed an ANDA with the FDA for 
approval of a generic form of Cardizem.33  However, Biovail was 
prevented from obtaining preliminary FDA approval for its generic 
Cardizem because Andrx’s 180-day exclusivity period had not yet 
been triggered and therefore had not expired.34  Consequently, 
Biovail was locked out of the Cardizem market. 
C.  Biovail’s Claims 
Biovail brought suit against Hoechst alleging that the partial 
settlement agreement between Hoechst and Andrx violated the 
Sherman Antitrust Act35 because it represented an illegal agree-
ment between competitors to restrain trade and willfully maintain a 
monopoly by Hoechst.36  Hoechst responded by seeking dismissal 
of the claims, asserting that Biovail could not show a sufficient set 
of facts to make a prima facie case that Hoechst violated the anti-
trust laws in any way that might entitle Biovail to relief.37  Thus, 
the issue in the case was whether Biovail’s complaint should be 
dismissed or whether the claims merited a trial.38 
In a motion to dismiss, all of Biovail’s well-pleaded complaints 
are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in fa-
vor of Biovail.39  Hoechst’s motion to dismiss would be granted if 
the court found “beyond doubt that . . .[plaintiff could] . . . prove 
no set of facts in support of [its] claim which would entitle [it] to 
relief”.40 
Hoechst acknowledged that the partial settlement agreement 
with Andrx included that (1) Hoechst would continue to prosecute 
its patent infringement claims against Andrx; (2) Andrx would 
withdraw its counterclaims against Hoechst; (3) Hoescht would 
make quarterly payments in the amount of ten million dollars to 
Andrx; (4) Andrx agreed to refrain from marketing generic Card-
izem until the resolution of the suit; (5) Andrx would continue to 
 
33. See Biovail, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 757. 
34. See id. at 758. 
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994). 
36. Biovail, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 758. 
37. Id. 
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(6). 
39. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 323 (1972). 
40. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
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prosecute its claim for FDA approval; and (6) Andrx would assert 
its right as first in line to bar others from gaining FDA approval 
and thereby entering the Cardizem market.41  Hoechst also did not 
dispute that at the time of their motion to dismiss that they sold 
80% of the Cardizem in the United States.42 
II.  ANALYSIS OF BIOVAIL’S CLAIMS UNDER THE SHERMAN 
ANTITRUST ACT 
Whether Biovail’s claims were sufficient to maintain an action 
against Hoechst was decided under the Sherman Act43, which pro-
tects consumers from high prices and reduced output caused by 
cartels and monopolies.44  Biovail’s claims were properly brought 
under the Sherman Act because the claims alleged that the 
Hoechst-Andrx suit and partial settlement unfairly blocked Biovail 
from selling an inexpensive, generic version of Cardizem, and that 
Hoechst thereby illegally restrained interstate trade and maintained 
an illegal monopoly on Cardizem. 
In this section the antitrust elements of Biovail’s claims are 
analyzed and the decision of the district court is presented. 
A.  Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
In order to establish a violation of section 1 of Sherman Act,45 
Biovail must establish that Hoechst engaged in (1) a conspiracy (2) 
to unreasonably restrain trade.46  A conspiracy “must comprise an 
 
41. Biovail, 49 F. Supp at 761; Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., v. Hoechst Aktienge-
sellschaf, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046 (1999). 
42. Biovail, 49 F. Supp at 761. 
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994). 
44. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE, 50 (1994). 
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1.  Section 1 states “every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, 
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” Id. 
46. Id.; Summit Health, Ltd v. Pihas, 500 U.S. 322, 330 (1991) (holding that an in-
terstate nexus must be shown to establish Federal jurisdiction.)  The plaintiff or the 
prosecution must allege and prove that the defendant’s illegal activities had a substantial 
impact under the commerce clause.  This requires a showing that the defendants act is 
itself in interstate commerce or that it has an effect on interstate commerce.  In Summit 
Health the Court held that a boycott designed to deny hospital staff privileges to a sur-
geon was reachable under the Sherman Act because the hospital itself was within the 
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agreement or meeting of the minds between at least two competi-
tors, for the purpose or with the effect of unreasonably restraining 
trade”.47  The making of the illegal agreement itself is the viola-
tion.48  Completing the conspiracy, an act furthering the conspir-
acy, or the success of the conspiracy do not have to be shown be-
cause they are not elements of the offense.49  Parties are liable so 
long as they made an illegal agreement.50 
An unreasonable “‘restraint of trade’ . . . [refers to] . . . a par-
ticular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite 
different sorts of agreements . . . .”51  Economic consequences may 
include eliminating competition, creating a monopoly, price fixing 
or interfering with free market forces.52 
The courts have developed three methods of analyzing agree-
ments to determine whether they constitute conspiracies to unrea-
sonably restrain trade.  The first analysis concerns agreements, 
which are illegal “per se.”53  An agreement is illegal per se when 
the restraint of trade has no legitimate justification, lacks any re-
deeming competitive purpose and “would always or almost always 
tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”54  Examples of 
per se violations include price fixing, allocations of markets and 
 
reach of congress and both the hospital and the plaintiff regularly served out-of state pa-
tients.  In Biovail, the parties did not dispute the effect on interstate commerce.  See Bio-
vail, 49 F. Supp. 761 n. 4. 
47. Meredith E.B. Bell & Elena Laskin, Antitrust Violations, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
357, 359 (1999) citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
48. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 n.59 (1940) 
(holding that an agreement to reduce output by independent members of a cartel violated 
Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act, even though the agreement did not directly fix 
prices). 
49. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223-24 n. 59. 
50. Id. 
51. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988). 
52. See Bell, supra note 47, at 360. 
53. Id. 
54. Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1; 19-20 (1979).  (holding 
that a blanket license arrangement which literally involved price fixing was not a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act because the arrangement so significantly reduced transac-
tion costs that it effectively made mass marketing of performance rights feasible); See 
also United States v. Topco Ass’n,, 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (holding that the allocations of 
markets was a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act). 
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group boycotts.55  When an alleged agreement is illegal per se, no 
facts need to be proven beyond the making of the agreement.56 
The second analysis is the “Rule of Reason”.57 
Rule of Reason analysis focuses on the state of competition 
with, as compared to without, the relevant agreement.  The central 
question is whether the relevant agreement likely harms competi-
tion by increasing the ability or incentive profitably to raise price 
above or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below what 
likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement.58 
The Rule of Reason analysis allows courts to factor in the de-
fendant’s assertion that an allegedly anti-competitive agreement 
may increase economic efficiency and competitiveness, and there-
fore not constitute a violation of the Sherman Act.59  The nature of 
the agreement and the absence of market power to control output 
or fix prices may actually demonstrate the absence of anticompeti-
tive harm.60 
The third analysis is the quick look doctrine.61  The quick look 
doctrine combines per se analysis with the more in depth inquiry of 
the Rule of Reason.62  The quick look doctrine is used to determine 
the legality of agreements that are not inherently competitive.63  
Under the quick look doctrine, the court is allowed to consider 
procompetitive justification for an agreement asserted by the de-
fendant.64  If the defendant successfully presents a procompetitive 
justification, then the court must do a complete examination under 
the Rule of Reason.65, 
 
55. See Bell, supra note 47, at 360, n.45. 
56. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223-224 n. 59. 
57. National Soc’y of Prof’l. Eng’rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) 
(holding that under Rule of Reason, the defendant must show that a particular practice is 
not anticompetitive.) 
58. Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, (visited Apr. 28, 
2000)  <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9910/jointventureguidlines.htm> [hereinafter, Anti-
trust Guidelines] 
59. Professional Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 687-89. 
60. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 58. 
61. See Bell, supra note 47, at 360. 
62. Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1; 17, n. 27 (1979). 
63. See Bell, supra note 47, at 360. 
64. Id. 
65. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20-25. 
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B.  Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
Biovail also alleged that Hoechst violated section 2 of the 
Sherman Act66 by monopolizing or attempting to monopolize the 
market for Cardizem.67  section 2 prohibits monopolization, at-
tempts to monopolize and conspiracies to monopolize.68  Monopo-
lization is shown by “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the 
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of 
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a con-
sequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent.”69  Attempted monopolization differs from actual monopoli-
zation by requiring a showing of anticompetitive or predatory 
behavior, a dangerous probability of successful monopolization, 
and a specific intent to monopolize.70 
In order to determine whether a firm has committed illegal mo-
nopolization, it is first necessary to define a relevant market.71  The 
relevant market is defined according to the product at issue and 
 
66. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).  Section 2 states, “Every person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to mo-
nopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” Id.; Unlike section 1, section 2 may 
apply to the conduct of single entities.  See United States v. Griffith et al., 334 U.S. 100, 
107 (1948).  As stated by Mr. Justice Douglas for the Court majority:  
A man with a monopoly of theatres in any one town commands the entrance for 
all films into that area. If he uses that strategic position to acquire exclusive 
privileges in a city where he has competitors, he is employing his monopoly 
power as a trade weapon against his competitors. It may be a feeble, ineffective 
weapon where he has only one closed or monopoly town. But as those towns 
increase in number throughout a region, his monopoly power in them may be 
used with crushing effect on competitors in other places. 
Id. 
Conspiracy to monopolize was not alleged in Biovail and will not be considered. See Bio-
vail, 49 F. Supp. at 761. 
67. Biovail, 49 F. Supp. at 761. 
68. 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
69. United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-571 (1966) (holding that sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act was violated by a high percentage of the market which was 
obtained in large part by unlawful and exclusionary practices). 
70. Spectrum Sports, Inc., v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (holding that 
attempted monopolization may be proved where a defendant has engaged in predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct with specific intent to monopolize and that there is a dangerous 
probability that the  defendant will achieve monopoly power); See also HOVENKAMP, su-
pra note 44, at 248-49. 
71. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 44, at 82-83. 
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geography.72  The product market is defined according to the abil-
ity of consumers to find substitutes for the product.73  The geo-
graphic market can be defined locally, regionally or nationally by 
considering whether consumers are able to travel to other districts 
to obtain the goods at issue. 74 
Having defined the relevant market, a court will ordinarily 
compute the defendant’s percentage of output in the relevant mar-
ket.75  The existence of monopoly power “ordinarily may be in-
ferred from the predominant share of the market.”76  However, 
monopoly power may also be defined as a large amount of market 
power in a relevant market77 where market power is the “ability of 
a firm to increase its profits by reducing output and charging more 
than a competitive price for its product”.78 
Thus, monopolization is likely to be found if there are no prod-
uct substitutes in the relevant market and a firm may raise prices or 
reduce output without causing customers to seek substitute prod-
ucts in such numbers that a price increase would be unprofitable.79, 
C.  Patent Misuse 
Significantly, Biovail did not argue that Hoechst violated sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act by abusing patent rights.  Courts do not 
presume that the patent holder’s right to exclude establishes market 
power in an antitrust sense.80  As described by the Federal Circuit, 
“[t]he virtually unlimited variety and scope of patented inventions 
and market situations militate against per se rules in these situa-
tions.”81  Moreover, the patent holder’s right to exclude competi-
 
72. Id. 
73. Grinell, 384 U.S. at 571. 
74. Id. (holding that the market at issue was nationwide rather then local.  In a pat-
ent case the geographic market is defined nationally.) 
75. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 44, at 82. 
76. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571. 
77. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 44, at 243. 
78. Id. at 79. 
79. See id. at 242 
80. Abbot Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F. 2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that 
existence of patent does not of itself establish presumption of market power in antitrust 
sense). 
81. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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tors by itself does not constitute monopoly power forbidden by the 
section 2.82  Antitrust laws do not require a “patent holder to forfeit 
the exclusionary power inherent in his patent the instant his patent 
monopoly affords him monopoly power over a relevant market.”83 
However, a firm that engages in patent misuse will be liable 
under section 2.84  Patent misuse occurs when a patent is being 
used anticompetitively and outside the scope of the patent grant.85  
The patent misuse doctrine is typically invoked as a defense when 
a patent owner sues a defendant for patent infringement.86  For ex-
ample, in Walker Process the Supreme Court found patent misuse 
occurred when a patent owner sued a defendant for infringement 
on a patent that the patent owner knew was obtained through 
fraud.87 
D.  Analysis of Biovail’s Claims Under the Sherman Act 
Biovail claimed essentially that Hoechst subverted the FDA 
regulatory scheme for anticompetitive purposes.88  Biovail argued 
that under a Rule of Reason analysis, the Hoechst-Andrx partial 
settlement violated section 1 because it harmed competition and 
restrained trade.89  The partial settlement was an agreement be-
tween the competitors, Hoechst and Andrx, which kept Biovail out 
of a market that Biovail would be allowed to enter in the absence 
of the agreement.90  Biovail argued, the ongoing infringement ac-
 
82. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-
78 (1965) (holding that obtaining a patent by fraud was a violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act). 
83. SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the ac-
cumulation of all patents in a market area, thus making it much more difficult for other 
firms to compete, does not violate antitrust laws). 
84. See Barry Evans, Boundaries have Changed for Patent Misuse Defense, Despite 
Limitations Reports of Its Death Exaggerated, N.Y.L.J., February 17, 1998, at S6, col. 3. 
85. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 44, at 218. 
86. See id. 
87. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 
(1965). 
88. See Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 
1286, 1303 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (holding that policies of 
the Sherman Act should not be sacrificed simply because defendants employ governmen-
tal processes to accomplish anticompetitive purposes). 
89. Biovail, 49 F. Supp. 759-760. 
90. Id. 
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tion and partial settlement was evidence of an agreement which 
violated section 1.  Hoechst, by engaging in tactics to forestall 
marketing generic Cardizem, reduced competition in Cardizem 
and, consequently, was able to charge elevated prices and reap il-
legal profits.91 
Biovail’s claims under section 2 of the Sherman Act asserted 
that Hoechst had achieved monopoly power in the relevant market 
for Cardizem because Hoechst sold 80 % of the Cardizem in the 
United States and, therefore, monopolization could be inferred 
from its predominant share of the market.92  Biovail further alleged 
that Hoechst violated section 2 by willfully seeking to maintain its 
monopoly power.  Biovail claimed that Hoechst, having the intent 
to monopolize, engaged in anticompetitive conduct because by us-
ing the ongoing infringement suit and partial settlement agreement 
to block all sales by later ANDA applicants.  Thus, Hoechst’s ac-
tions maintained a monopoly for Hoechst. 
Hoechst responded that Biovail’s injury was speculative.93  
First, Hoechst argued that Biovail’s claims were not ripe because 
Biovail had not yet been granted tentative approval by the FDA for 
its generic Cardizem.94  Therefore, Biovail could not show that it 
was being kept out of a market to which it was otherwise entitled.  
Second, Hoechst argued Biovail could not show that the Hoechst-
Andrx agreement unreasonably restrained trade.  Regardless of the 
partial settlement, Andrx may have decided not to start marketing 
Cardizem, until the conclusion of the Hoechst-Andrx patent in-
fringement trial.95  Hoechst noted that should Andrx go forward 
with marketing before the conclusion of the infringement suit, 
Andrx might be subject to triple damages for willful patent in-
fringement in the event that Andrx lost the suit.  Hoechst argued 
that even the FDA recognized that “a prudent ANDA applicant” 
may wish to delay marketing to avoid the risk of potentially devas-
tating damages.96  Third, Hoechst responded that Biovail’s claim 
 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 766, relying on United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
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consisted of nothing more then frustration with the Hatch-Waxman 
exclusivity period.97 
E.  The Decision of the District Court 
While the court admitted that Hoechst’s arguments were sig-
nificant, it did not dismiss the case.  The court reasoned that 
while it is possible that Andrx is not marketing its generic 
product because it does not want to risk potential patent in-
fringement damages, it is certainly possible that Andrx is 
not marketing its generic product-and hence stalling the ex-
clusivity period because the defendant is paying it forty 
million dollars.98 
Since Hoechst could not show the absence of a prima facie, the 
case was not dismissed.99 
III.  HOECHST ENJOYS IMMUNITY FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE 
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT UNDER THE NOERR-PENNINGTON 
DOCTRINE 
Even if Biovail succeeds in making a prima facie case under 
the Sherman Act, it is likely that Hoechst will enjoy substantial 
Noerr Immunity for the partial settlement and the Hoechst-Andrx 
lawsuit.100  Noerr Immunity limits the antitrust laws by insuring 
that private activities aimed at influencing the government are im-
mune from prosecution, even though such activities may restrain 
trade or result in a monopoly.101  The policy behind Noerr is that if 
the antitrust laws were not so limited then, the antitrust laws would 
violate the right to petition the government as guaranteed under the 
First Amendment of the Constitution.102  Thus, Noerr Immunity 
 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 777. 
100. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (stating that the Noerr doctrine is 
based on the presumption that the government cannot violate the antitrust laws).  See also 
Eastern R.R Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc, 365 U.S. 127, 145 (1961) (holding 
that a restraint upon trade or monopolization resulting from a valid governmental action 
can result in a violation of the Sherman Act). 
101. Eastern R.R , 365 U.S. at 145. 
102. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) 
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necessarily balances the Sherman Act’s interest in promoting com-
petition against the constitutionally guaranteed right to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances. 
A.  The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
The Noerr Immunity doctrine was originally articulated in 
Eastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.103  In 
Eastern Railroad, the issue was whether the defendant’s railroads 
violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by conducting a pub-
licity campaign urging the passage of state laws that would harm 
the trucking industry.104  The Court held that even though the rail-
roads may have used unethical business practices to destroy the 
truckers as competitors, the Sherman Act was not applicable be-
cause the activities at issue were limited to soliciting the Legisla-
ture and the Executive to pass and enforce specific laws.105  The 
Court held: 
[i]n a representative democracy such as this, these branches 
of government act on behalf of the people and, to a very 
large extent, the whole concept of representation depends 
upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known 
to their representatives. To hold that the government retains 
the power to act in this representative capacity and yet 
hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform 
the government of their wishes would impute to the 
Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, 
but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis 
whatever in the legislative history of that Act. Secondly, 
and of at least equal significance, such a construction of the 
Sherman Act would raise important constitutional ques-
 
(holding that it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that 
groups with common interests may not, without violating antitrust laws, use channels and 
procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of 
view respecting resolution of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their com-
petitors); James B. Perrine, Defining the Sham Limitation to the Noerr-Pennington Anti-
trust Immunity Doctrine: An Analysis of the Professional Real Estate Investors v. Colum-
bia Pictures Industries Decision 46 ALA. L. REV. 815 (1995). 
103. 365 U.S. 127, 145 (1961). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
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tions. The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected 
by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly im-
pute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.106 
In California Motor Transportation Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 
the Court definitively extended Noerr Immunity to also protect the 
right to petition administrative agencies and the courts. 107  In Cali-
fornia Motor, it was alleged that the antitrust defendants engaged 
in a concerted effort to bring actions against the plaintiffs before 
state and federal agencies in order to destroy the plaintiffs as com-
petitors.108  It was further alleged that the defendants brought these 
actions irrespective of the merits and with the sole purpose of de-
stroying the competitive ability of the plaintiffs.109  The Court held 
that Noerr Immunity allowed the defendants to have the right to 
access courts and agencies to defeat the applications of competitors 
because the Sherman Act could not be construed to limit access to 
agencies or the courts.110  The Court stated: 
[t]he same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or 
groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both 
creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and 
to courts, the third branch of Government.  Certainly the 
right to extends to all departments of the Government.  The 
right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the 
right of petition.  We conclude that it would be destructive 
of rights of association and of petition to hold that groups 
with common interests may not, without violating the anti-
trust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and 
federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and 
points of view respecting resolution of their business and 
economic interests vis-à-vis their competitors.111 
 
106. Id. at 137-38. 
107. 404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 519. 
111. Id. (citation omitted). 
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B.  The Sham Exception to Noerr-Pennington 
However, in California Motor, the Court recognized that im-
munity under the Noerr Immunity doctrine was limited.112  The 
Court held that Noerr Immunity did not apply to litigation which 
“is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an at-
tempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a com-
petitor . . . . [In that case] . . . the application of the Sherman Act 
would be justified.”113 
The Court did not specify the types of activities that constitute 
a sham lawsuit.  As they observed, “[o]pponents before agencies or 
courts often think poorly of the other’s tactics, motions or defenses 
and may readily call them baseless.”114  The majority opinion, 
written by Justice Douglas, suggested that sham litigation was ap-
parent when there was “a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims . . . 
which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and 
judicial process have been abused.”115 
Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in California Motor was 
that sham litigation analysis required a subjective inquiry that ac-
counted for the intent of the accused.116  The plaintiffs “are entitled 
to prove that the real intent of the conspirators was not to invoke 
the processes of the administrative agencies and courts but to dis-
courage and ultimately to prevent the respondents from invoking 
those processes.”117 Upon the showing of intent, “the application 
of the Sherman Act would be justified”.118 
This disagreement between Justice Douglas and Justice Stew-
art, whether analysis of sham litigation should be determined using 
an objective or intent based test, represented a dispute which con-
tinued in the Court for several years.  In the words of one commen-
tator, “[t]he Court’s uncertainty concerning what constitutes a 
sham has been remarkable.  In almost every Noerr case since Pen-
nington in 1965 the court has rephrased its standard for determin-
 
112. Id. at 511. 
113. Id. (quoting Eastern R.R., 365 U.S. at 144.) 
114. Id. at 513. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 516. 
117. Id. at 518. 
118. Id.(quoting Eastern R.R., 365 U.S. at 144). 
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ing whether antitrust conduct would be viewed as a sham.”119 
In Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures 
(“PRE”), the Supreme Court finally held that the sham inquiry 
contained an indispensable objective, as well as a subjective com-
ponent.120  Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, outlined a 
two-part test under which an antitrust plaintiff must first show that 
a lawsuit is objectively baseless and then show that the lawsuit was 
initiated with bad faith to destroy the plaintiff as a competitor: 
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that 
no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the mer-
its.  If an objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasona-
bly calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized 
under Noerr, and an antitrust claim premised on the sham excep-
tion must fail.  Only if a challenged litigation is objectively merit-
less may a court examine the litigant’s subjective motivation.  Un-
der the second part of our definition of a sham, the court should 
focus on whether the baseless litigation conceals an attempt to in-
terfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.121 
The court compared the objectively baseless standard for sham 
litigation to bringing a wrongful civil proceeding.122  The Court 
reasoned by analogy that for the defendant to not have Noerr Im-
munity, the antitrust plaintiff must demonstrate that there was ab-
solutely no objective merit to the defendant’s position because the 
claims were so baseless that no reasonable litigant could realisti-
cally expect to secure favorable relief.123  Since in a wrongful civil 
proceeding “the absence of probable cause is an essential element 
of the suit,” the defendant could defeat an allegation of sham litiga-
tion by showing probable cause.124  Moreover, the court held, as in 
a wrongful civil proceeding action, “[p]robable cause to institute 
civil proceeding requires no more than a reasonable belief that 
 
119. Perrine, supra note 102, at 825, n. 61. 
120. Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49 (1993) 
(holding that an objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be “sham,” within mean-
ing of exception to Noerr doctrine immunity from antitrust liability, regardless of plain-
tiff’s subjective intent). 
121. Id. at 60-61. 
122. Id. at 58. 
123. Id. at 62. 
124. Id. at 63. 
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there is a chance that [a] claim may be held valid upon adjudica-
tion.”125 
Although Justice Stevens concurred with the results of the de-
cision in PRE, he sharply disagreed with the objectively baseless 
standard advanced by the Court.126  He argued that the objectively 
baseless standard for determining whether a lawsuit was a sham 
was too broad because the standard would encompass lawsuits that 
reasonable litigants could expect to win, but which were neverthe-
less a sham designed to keep competitors out of a market.127  Ste-
vens believed sham litigation was “appropriately applied to a case, 
or series of cases, in which the plaintiff is indifferent to the out-
come of the litigation itself, but has nevertheless sought to impose 
a collateral harm on the defendant”.128 
The different standards articulated by the majority and concur-
ring opinions in PRE reflected the different policy concerns.  
Thomas was concerned that a subjective test would undermine No-
err Immunity.129  Thus, he believed that an objectively baseless 
standard would give “real intelligible guidance” as when to apply 
the sham exception.130  Stevens, on the other hand, was concerned 
that the objectively baseless standard would allow monopolists to 
bring actions, which had “a colorable basis in law” but, were none-
theless designed to harass potential competitors. 131  Thus, Stevens 
thought that the objective standard would allow potential antitrust 
defendants to escape liability.  He advanced a standard, which al-
lowed for the analysis of sham litigation on a case by case basis.132 
 
125. Id. (quoting Hubbard v. Beatty & Hyde, Inc., 343 Mass. 258, 262 (1961)). 
126. Professional Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 67. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 68 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
129. Id. at 60. 
130. Id. (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 
503 (1988)). 
131. Id. at 73 (Stevens concurrence quoting Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, 
Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (1982)). 
132. Stevens stated: 
[i]n sum, in this case I agree with the Court’s explanation of why respondents’ 
copyright infringement action was not “objectively baseless,” and why allega-
tions of improper subjective motivation do not make such a lawsuit a “sham.” I 
would not, however, use this easy case as a  vehicle for announcing a rule that 
may govern the decision of difficult cases, some of which may involve abuse of 
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C.  Noerr-Immunity Protects Hoechst from Liability 
Noerr Immunity protects Hoechst from liability for Biovail’s 
antitrust injuries arising out of the Hoechst-Andrx suit and the par-
tial settlement.  Since Noerr immunizes Hoechst’s right to petition 
the government for grievances, Hoechst is protected from liability 
for the Hoechst-Andrx lawsuit.  Hoechst cannot incur antitrust li-
ability for bringing suit against Andrx because to do so would deny 
Hoechst access to the courts. 
Noerr also immunizes the Hoechst-Andrx partial settlement 
because the partial settlement agreement is a private action which 
is incidental to a valid effort to influence government action.  As 
explained in Allied Tube, “where, independent of any government 
action, the anticompetitive restraint results directly from private 
action, the restraint cannot form the basis for antitrust liability if it 
is “incidental” to a valid effort to influence governmental ac-
tion.”133  Thus, Andrx’s agreement with Hoechst not to sell Card-
izem, thereby preventing the exclusivity period from being trig-
gered is protected under Noerr. 
Moreover, Hoescht is operating within the scope of their patent 
rights by limiting Andrx’s production of a patented drug.  Since the 
Cardizem patents are presumed valid for the duration of the 
Hoechst-Andrx lawsuit, Hoechst has the right to prevent Andrx 
from making and selling Cardizem for the duration of the trial. 134 
If necessary, Hoechst could obtain a preliminary injunction to pre-
vent Andrx from selling Cardizem for the duration of the lawsuit. 
135 Any law that prevented Hoechst from limiting Andrx’s produc-
tion and sale of Cardizem during the trial would effectively limit 
Hoechst’s access to the courts to enforce their patent, violating 
 
the judicial process. Accordingly, I concur in the Court’s judgment but not in 
its opinion. 
Id. at 75. 
133. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499. 
134.  C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that clear and convincing affirmative evidence is required to show that the presump-
tion of validity is not justified and that the patent is being misused to create an antitrust 
violation). 
135. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending 
either a permanent injunction or a trial on the merits. FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (A) (1); See 
O’CONNOR’S FEDERAL RULES, Chapter 2, § 3, 63 (1998). 
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Hoechst’s First amendment right to petition the government for 
grievances.136 
Noerr also immunizes Andrx’s agreement to assert its rights as 
the first ANDA applicant because Andrx is merely exercising its 
rights before the FDA.  If Andrx could not petition the FDA to 
block later ANDA applicants, then Andrx’s right to petition the 
government for grievances would be blocked. 
Hoechst cannot be liable for Biovail’s inability to enter the 
Cardizem market because the antitrust harm to Biovail is the result 
of the exclusion period of the Hatch-Waxman Act in combination 
with the patent laws, rather then a direct action of Hoechst or 
Andrx.  Hoechst is merely pursuing its own interest under Hatch-
Waxman. As the Supreme Court stated  in City of Columbia v. 
Omni Outdoor Advertising:137 
Any lobbyist or applicant, in addition to getting himself 
heard, seeks by procedural and other means to get his op-
ponent ignored.  Policing the legitimate boundaries of such 
defensive strategies, when they are conducted in the con-
text of a genuine attempt to influence governmental action, 
is not the role of the Sherman Act.138 
Preventing Hoechst from pursuing their interests under Hatch-
Waxman cannot be accomplished without limiting Hoechst’s First 
Amendment right to petition the government.  Thus, even though 
Hoechst’s activities may have been part of a strategy to dominate 
the Cardizem market, they are immune under Noerr for antitrust 
injuries to Biovail. 
D.  The Hoechst Suit Against Andrx is not a Sham 
Biovail would probably respond to Hoechst’s claim for immu-
nity under the Noerr Immunity doctrine by arguing that the 
Hoechst-Andrx dispute was an example of sham litigation, in-
tended to keep Biovail from entering the Cardizem market.  How-
ever, under the objectively baseless standard articulated in PRE, 
 
136. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
137. 499 U.S. 365, 367 (1990). 
138. Id. at 382. 
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Biovail probably will not prevail. 
The objectively baseless standard allows an antitrust defendant 
to irrefutably defeat a claim of sham litigation by showing that 
they had probable cause to sue.  Probable cause “requires no more 
than a reasonable belief that there is a chance that [a] claim may be 
held valid upon adjudication.”  Hoechst will be able to show as a 
matter of law that they had probable cause to sue Andrx for patent 
infringement. 
To appreciate the reason that Hoechst can show probable cause 
as a matter of law, it is useful to compare Hoechst’s claims to those 
of the plaintiff in PRE.  In PRE, a motion picture studio, brought a 
copyright infringement suit against the operators of a hotel.  The 
studio alleged that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff’s copy-
rights in various films by renting videocassettes to guests for view-
ing in hotel rooms.139  The Court reasoned probable cause could be 
decided as a matter of law because there was no dispute as to the 
facts underlying the legal claims.140 
The Court noted that the studio’s copyright gave them the ex-
clusive rights to perform the motion pictures publicly.141  The stu-
dio’s had this right regardless of whether  “it intended any mo-
nopolistic or predatory use . . .”.142  “Indeed, to condition a 
copyright upon a demonstrated lack of anticompetitive intent 
would upset the notion of copyright as a ‘limited grant’ of ‘mo-
nopoly privileges’ intended simultaneously ‘to motivate the crea-
tive activity of authors’ and ‘to give the public appropriate access 
to their work product.’”143  The Court concluded that since a rea-
sonable copyright owner in the studio’s position would believe that 
it had some chance of winning an infringement suit against the de-
fendant, the studio could show probable cause to sue the hotel 
owners.  Having shown probable cause, the studio had defeated 
any claim by the hotel operators that the studio’s lawsuit was a 
sham. 
 
139.  Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49 (1993). 
140. Id. at 62. 
141. Id. at 64; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (4) (Supp. IV 1998). 
142. Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 64. 
143. Id. 
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As in PRE, the underlying facts of the Hoechst-Andrx patent 
infringement suit are not in dispute.  Hoechst owns a valid patent 
in Cardizem. Andrx’s ANDA filing gave Hoechst a cause of action 
to sue for patent infringement.  Moreover, in the case of a patent 
infringement suit, a court will presume that the infringement suit 
was brought in good faith and was reasonable.144  Therefore, 
Hoechst can show probable cause as a matter of law because any 
reasonable patent owner in their position would believe that it had 
some chance of winning an infringement suit against Andrx.  Thus, 
Biovail will not be able to show that the Hoechst-Andrx lawsuit 
was objectively baseless. 
Since under PRE, a plaintiff’s intent with regard to allegations 
of sham litigation are only considered after a suit has been shown 
to be objectively baseless, a court will not be able to consider evi-
dence on whether Hoechst intentionally created an anticompetitive 
situation by partially settling their suit with Andrx.  However, even 
if Biovail could show an objectively baseless lawsuit they probably 
would not be able to show that Hoechst had the intent required for 
sham litigation.  Under PRE, the intent required is that the plaintiff 
initiates the litigation to directly interfere with the defendant’s 
business.  Hoechst’s intent was to stop Andrx from infringing their 
patent. Hoechst’s intent was not directed at Biovail.  Since Biovail 
could not show Hoechst initiated the litigation to interfere directly 
with Biovail’s business, they can not show Hoechst had the re-
quired intent under PRE for sham litigation.  As the Supreme Court 
has stated, “the purpose of delaying a competitor’s entry into the 
market does not render lobbying activity a ‘sham’ unless . . . the 
delay is sought to be achieved only by the lobbying process itself, 
and not by the governmental action that the lobbying seeks”. 145 
It is interesting to speculate if the analysis presented by Justice 
Stevens in PRE might result in a different outcome for Biovail’s 
claims.  Stevens argued that the objectively baseless standard was 
too high because defendants who could establish probable cause, 
might nevertheless be engaged in sham litigation.  He proposed to 
analyze whether litigation was a sham by determining if the liti-
 
144.  C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
145. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365, 367 (1990). 
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gants were indifferent to the outcome of the suit.  Under the Ste-
ven’s analysis, Biovail could argue the Hoechst-Andrx litigation 
was a sham because Hoechst was indifferent to the outcome of the 
patent infringement suit.  Hoechst indifference was evident be-
cause after reaching a partial settlement neither Hoechst nor Andrx 
had advanced the litigation. Biovail could further assert that 
Hoechst was simply prolonging the litigation as a strategy to delay 
competitors from entering the Cardizem market. Thus, it is likely 
that under Stevens analysis, Hoechst would be liable for antitrust 
violations because their litigation qualified as a sham. 
However, since the standard for determining whether a litiga-
tion is a sham is the objectively baseless standard articulated by the 
Supreme Court in PRE, Biovail would not prevail by arguing that 
the Hoechst-Andrx lawsuit is a sham. 
CONCLUSION 
Biovail v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft illustrates how the anti-
trust laws and Noerr Immunity are balanced between promoting 
competition and protecting the right to petition the government 
guaranteed by the Constitution.  The Sherman Act prevents com-
panies from illegally restraining trade or monopolizing markets.  
Noerr Immunity limits the Sherman Act from infringing on the 
right to petition when a party seeks to gain economic advantage 
through the political or judicial system.  The Supreme Court has 
decided that the constitutional rights are sufficiently precious that 
the standard to defeat Noerr Immunity using the sham exception is 
very high. 
In the present case, Noerr Immunity protects Hoechst from li-
ability under the Sherman Act, even though Hoechst may have had 
the intent to manipulate the Hatch-Waxman Act to keep competi-
tors out of the Cardizem market.  The Noerr Immunity doctrine is 
justified because the alternative would be that the antitrust laws 
would regulate Hoechst’s access to the courts, thereby jeopardizing 
rights protected under the First Amendment of the constitution. 
 
